General equilibrium analyses of layo costs have had mixed messages on the implications for employment. This paper brings out the economic forces at work and explains the disparate results. Speci cally, w e show that positive employment e ects of layo costs come through reducing labor reallocation, whereas negative e ects come through reducing the private return to work due to those layo costs and the associated ine cient allocation of labor. Additional adverse employment e ects can arise through an increase in the e ective bargaining strength of workers. These forces explain why l a yo costs tend to increase employment in search models while the opposite is true in models with employment lotteries. In matching models, we show that the employment e ects depend critically on how l a yo costs are assumed to enter the bargaining process.
Introduction and Summary
A common concern is that labor market rigidities such a s l a yo costs are responsible for high European unemployment see e.g. OECD 1994. As documented by Emerson 1988 and Lazear 1990 , layo costs are particularly burdensome in Europe. This paper explores a few general equilibrium models to see what kind of relationship there is between layo costs and an economy's level of employment. The analysis focuses solely on layo costs in isolation from other European labor market policies that might also in uence unemployment rates such as minimum wages and generous unemployment compensation.
As pointed out by Lazear 1990 , any mandated severance pay can be o set by a n e cient labor contract and hence, there would be no real e ects. The literature on layo costs and employment h a ve therefore focused on layo costs that are not pure transfers between rms and workers but rather some form of resource costs or taxes paid to the government. It has been shown that such l a yo costs do have r e a l b u t a m biguous employment e ects in partial equilibrium analyses see Bentolila and Bertola 1990, and Bertola 1990 . These costs reduce both rms' hiring rates and ring rates. The cyclical implications are therefore fairly clear; layo costs increase employment in troughs and reduce employment in peaks. But it is unclear what the e ects are on the average employment level. Bentolila and Bertola nd in their model that layo costs actually increase average employment since the fact that they prevent l a yo s dominates the e ect from lower hiring. The question is whether or not this result is born out in a general equilibrium.
Early general equilibrium analyses by Burda 1992 , Hopenhayn and Rogerson 1993 , and Saint-Paul 1995 conclude that layo costs a ect employment negatively. They reach the same result but in quite di erent models of employment determination. However, later general equilibrium models by Alvarez and Veracierto 1998 , and Mortensen and Pissarides 1999 display positive employment e ects of layo costs. Our paper integrates and explains these disparate results by studying bare-bones models in three dominant frameworks of employment determination; a search model, a matching model and a model with employment lotteries. We conclude that there is a strong presumption why employment implications of layo costs should be either positive or negative in a particular framework. There is a fundamental economic force at work in each framework which i n teracts with an essential feature of that class of models. This insight is obscured in the literature because of all the extra features and complications that are added to the models. Though, earlier general-equilibrium analyses of layo costs do illustrate our nding that the employment implications in a framework are robust and invariant to di erent speci cations of the rest of the model.
To shed light on Hopenhayn and Rogerson's 1993 conclusion that layo costs signicantly reduce equilibrium employment, we abstract from the elaborate rm size dynamics of their model and focus on employment lotteries as the sole important feature of their analysis. Since the private economy perceives layo costs as equivalent to a less productive technology, these costs induce households to choose a lower probability o f w orking in the lotteries over employment. This substitution between numberof employed and unemployed can operate smoothly since the complete-market equilibrium has aggregate consumption sharing that insures individual workers against unemployment. Thus, in models with employment lotteries, negative e m p l o yment implications of layo costs are explained by t h e substitution e ect in response to a lower private return to work. In contrast, a standard search model where agents are left to fend for themselves tends to produce the opposite result, i.e., employment increases with higher layo costs. The explanation is that layo costs slow d o wn the reallocation of labor, and thereby reduce the rate of frictional unemployment. This e ect of labor being locked into" their current e m p l o yment drives the lower unemployment rate in Alvarez and Veracierto's 1998 analysis of layo costs. Their auxiliary assumptions on capital accumulation, risk aversion and incomplete markets are not essential for the employment outcome but do matter for the welfare implications.
In the case of the matching model, the e ects of layo costs depend upon the speci c assumption on how these costs a ect the bargaining game between rms and workers. When using Saint-Paul's 1995 assumption that layo costs increase workers' relative share of the match surplus, the model reproduces his result that layo costs increase the unemployment rate. The reason is that the equilibrium condition that rms nance vacancy costs and layo costs with retained earnings from the matches becomes di cult to satisfy when higher layo costs erode the fraction of match surpluses going to rms. An increase in the equilibrium unemployment rate accomplishes two things; the expected time and cost for rms to ll vacancies are reduced, and workers' bargaining position is weakened because of longer average unemployment spells. In contrast, if layo costs do not alter the relative split of the match surplus between rms and workers, the employment e ect tends to be the same as in the search model where higher layo costs reduce the rate of unemployment. Once again, the dominating e ect is that layo costs diminish the value of reallocating labor so that job tenures lengthen and unemployment f a l l s .
The last explanation applies also to Mortensen and Pissarides' 1999 matching model with a two-tier wage system such that layo costs do not a ect the relative split of the match surplus when rms bargain with not yet hired workers, while these costs do increase the relative surplus share of hired workers in consecutive renegotiations. We demonstrate that their speci cation is formally equivalent to our second assumption that the relative split of the match surplus is una ected throughout the employment relationship. The only di erence between the two formulations is that the wage pro le in the Mortensen and Pissarides' setting is tantamount to new workers posting a bond equal to their share of any future layo tax.
A prerequisite for layo costs to reduce unemployment in the search model and the matching with a constant relative split of the match surplus is that the production technology allows for an endogenous lengthening of job tenures. Burda's 1992 nding that layo costs unambiguously increase unemployment in a matching model follows from his assumption of an exogenous rate of job destruction. We use such counterexamples with extreme parameterizations to further shed light on the workings of the di erent models.
The next section describes the production technology and the government's policy of imposing a layo tax for each job that is destroyed. These assumptions are maintained throughout the paper, and they capture the essential features of the general equilibrium analyses of layo costs in the literature. Section 3 presents our three di erent models of employment determination, which are bare-bones versions of the models in the literature in order to highlight their central mechanisms in the most transparent w ay. Numerical simulations and robustness tests are utilized in Section 4 to study the employment e ects of layo taxes, and Section 5 explains the economic forces at work. After a discussion of welfare implications in Section 6, we o er some concluding comments in the nal section.
Technology and Government Policy
A v ery simple technology will be useful to bring out the employment implications of layo costs in di erent models. An agent is either unemployed in period t, n t = 0 , o r full-time employed, n t = 1 . 1 The productivity of a new job is equal to p o , and the future productivity level follow s a M a r k ov process given by the distribution function Gp; p 0 = Probp t+1 p 0 j p t = p w h i c h is decreasing in p. The job disappears when there is no worker assigned to the job. The productivity l e v el is observed at the beginning of a period before the decision whether or not to retain the job is made.
The government imposes a tax 0 for each job that is destroyed. The tax revenues, denoted T per capita, are handed back lump-sum to the agents. By abstracting from distortionary transfer policies and other kind of taxes, we can isolate the employment e ects due to layo costs. These assumptions on government policy and technology capture the essential features of the general equilibrium analyses of layo costs in the literature.
Alternative Models of Employment Determination
We consider three alternative models of employment determination; a search model, a matching model and a model with employment lotteries. We study stationary equilibria when each model is populated by a continuum of in nitely lived workers of measure one.
First, in the spirit of McCall 1970, we will assume that workers must search for new jobs. Unemployed workers choose an optimal search i n tensity, which will in uence the average length of unemployment spells. Taking the search costs into account, employed workers will in turn have to decide on an optimal reservation productivity. F or realizations of the productivity level greater than or equal to the reservation productivity, they remain on the job, and otherwise they leave to search for another job.
Second, we will examine a matching model along the lines of Diamond 1982 , Mortensen 1982 and Pissarides 1985 . The number of vacancies and unemployed workers enter as arguments in a matching function to determine the number of successful matches in any given period. The surplus associated with a match is split between the worker and the rm through Nash bargaining. We will explore the implications of two di erent bargaining assumptions: a the worker's relative share of the match surplus stays constant w h e n varying the layo cost, b the worker's relative share increases with the layo cost. In an equilibrium, the number of vacancies is such that the expected discounted pro t associated with posting a vacancy is zero.
Third, we will follow the approach taken in Hopenhayn and Rogerson's 1993 analysis of layo costs, in which v ariations in the employment l e v el is driven by optimal changes in employment lotteries. In their framework, workers and jobs can be matched without any frictions. But the restriction that all jobs must be full-time is binding and, thus, it is welfare enhancing to introduce employment lotteries as in Hansen 1985 and Rogerson 1988 . In each period, agents are assumed to choose a probability o f w orking instead of the number of hours to work. A lottery then determines which agents actually work. The choice of probabilities and the outcome of the lottery are assumed to be public information, so that insurance markets are fully operational for the idiosyncratic risk associated with the lottery. Firms create new jobs as long as the expected discounted pro ts are nonnegative.
Search m odel
An unemployed worker chooses a search i n tensity s 0 at a disutility o f s w h i c h is increasing in s. With probability s, the unemployed worker nds a new job at the beginning of next period. We assume that s 2 0; 1 , and that it is increasing in s. T Associated with the solution of equations 2 and 3 will be two n umbers s; p giving an optimal search i n tensity of an unemployed worker and a reservation productivity o f a n employed worker. Given this formulation with self-employed workers and no other assets in the economy, the expected life-time utility of an employed worker with productivity p is given by V p, and the welfare of an unemployed worker is equal to V u . 2
Matching model
The preference speci cation for the matching model is the same as for the search m o d e l except that we drop the disutility of searching, 2 The aggregate implications of the model would be the same, if we instead let nancial intermediaries o er the following insurance contracts to job nders under the assumption of full commitment. A contract indexed by p; w speci es that the intermediary receives the output of the job and pays w to the worker as long as the productivity is equal to or greater than p. When the productivity falls below p, t h e contract expires with the intermediary liable for the layo tax. In a competitive equilibrium with free entry of intermediaries, there will be a unique contract p; w traded where p is the same as the reservation productivity under self employment, and w is such that the expected present v alue of an intermediary's pro ts is zero. That is, both job nders and intermediaries will be indi erent t o e n tering into the contract; job nders attain the same expected utility as under self employment and intermediaries just break even. The equilibrium contract is sustainable since the intermediary and the worker will never mutually agree to renegotiate a signed contract. Not surprisingly, i n troducing insurance contracts in an economy w i t h risk-neutral agents cannot essentially change things.
Let Zp be the match surplus associated with a productivity l e v el p, i.e., the expected discounted value of the match in excess of the worker's outside option Z u . F or a given Z u , A standard approach in the matching literature is to assume that the match s u r p l u s is split between the worker and the rm through Nash bargaining. Let Fp a n d Wp denote the rm's and the worker's expected discounted value in a match with productivity level p, where Wp includes the worker's continuation value Z u . That is, the following identity holds
The rm's and the worker's shares of the match surplus are then set so as to maximize a Nash product. Here we will explore the implications of two alternative speci cations of the Nash product:
, Wp 8:a
The alternative speci cation 7.b adopts the assumption of Saint-Paul 1995 that the layo cost changes the rm's threat point from 0 to , , and thereby increases the worker's relative share of the match surplus. Solving for the sharing rules yields:
Wp , Z u = , Zp + and Fp = 1 , Zp , :
Mortensen and Pissarides 1999 propose still another bargaining speci cation where 7.a is the Nash product when a worker and a rm meet for the rst time, while the Nash product in 7.b characterizes all their consecutive renegotiations. The idea is that the rm will not incur any l a yo tax if the rm and worker do not agree upon a wage in the rst encounter because there is never an employment relationship. In contrast, the rm's threat point i s w eakened in future negotiations with an already employed worker since the rm would then have t o p a y a l a yo tax if the match i s b r o k en up. Except for the wage pro le, the appendix demonstrates that this alternative speci cation is equivalent to just assuming 7.a for all periods. The intuition is that the modi ed wage pro le under the Mortensen and Pissarides' assumption is tantamount to a new hire posting a bond equal to his share of the future layo tax. It is therefore su cient to here focus on the rst two bargaining speci cations. The expressions capture the two possible outcomes in the next period; the unemployed worker either nds a job or continues to look for one. The remaining equilibrium condition that rms post vacancies until the expected pro ts are driven down to zero can be expressed as follows for Nash products 7:a and 7:b, respectively, A stationary equilibrium is consistent with any arbitrary distribution of rm ownership among the workers. The asset value of each rm is such that its expected gross rate of return is equal to 1= , and the economy's aggregate assets generate the same but deterministic rate of return. Let us here assume that all workers own identical shares of the economy's total assets. The expected life-time utility of an employed worker with productivity p is then given by Wp + + T 1 , ;
where the lump-sum transfer from the government, T, is just equal to the per capita value of all paid layo taxes. By replacing Wp b y Z u , the expression shows the welfare of an unemployed worker.
Model with employment lotteries
The linear preferences in the two previous models do not leave a n y room for welfareimproving employment lotteries. We therefore introduce curvature on the consumption term. As in Hopenhayn and Rogerson 1993, we where v 0 = 0 a n d v1 = A l . All agents are identical and have access to markets to insure against the idiosyncratic risk associated with employment lotteries. This implies that the economy behaves as though there were a representative a g e n t with preferences de ned by
where N t is the fraction of agents who are working in period t.
Firms and workers meet without any frictions in a Walrasian labor market. In a stationary equilibrium with the gross interest rate equal to 1= , the equilibrium wage rate is determined from the demand side for labor as follows. Consider a rm that maximizes expected discounted pro ts and takes the wage w as given. Let Xp; w be the rm's value of a job with productivity p. The Bellman's equation can then be written as As noted by Hopenhayn and Rogerson 1993 , another implication of a stationary equilibrium is that the representative agent's optimization problem reduces to a static problem of the form, max N uc , A l N subject to c w N + + T ; 15 where the pro ts from rms, , and the lump-sum transfer from the government, T, are taken as given by the agents. In a stationary equilibrium with w ; N , we h a ve
where Hp is once again the fraction of all jobs in a stationary equilibrium with a productivity less than or equal to p. Since all agents are identical including their asset holdings, the expected life-time utility of an agent before seeing the outcome of the employment lottery is equal to
Numerical Examples

Calibration
The model period is chosen to be two w eeks. We set the discount factor = 0 :9985, making the annual interest rate 4.0 percent. Productivity l e v els are con ned to the unit interval with a grid size of 500 points, and the productivity o f a n e w j o b i s p o = 0 :75. The
Markov process for the future productivity l e v el is constructed as follows. With probability 0:96, the productivity will be the same as in the previous period, and, with probability 0:04, the productivity i s d r a wn from a distributionGp; p 0 . That is, the worker will on average draw a new productivity level once a year. The distribution functionGp; p 0 for the new productivity level p 0 is given by a normal distribution with a mean equal to the previous productivity l e v el p and a variance of 0:01, which is truncated to the unit interval and normalized to integrate to one. The Cobb-Douglas form and a match elasticity with respect to unemployment, , of around 0:5 are common in the matching literature, and so is our next assumption that the worker's bargaining strength, , is equal to . 4 See e.g. Pissarides and Mortensen, 1999. Following Hopenhayn and Rogerson 1993 , the preference speci cation in the model with employment lotteries is uc = logc and the disutility o f w ork is calibrated to match an employment to population ratio equal to 0.6 which leads us to choose A l = 1 :6.
The simulations based on these parameter values are followed by a sensitivity analysis. The qualitative results are then found to be robust to perturbations of plus and minus 50 percent in all dimensions of the benchmark parameterization.
Simulation results
We compute stationary equilibria for di erent v alues of the layo cost, 2 0; 30 . As a point of reference, = 20 corresponds to a layo cost roughly equal to one year of an average worker's output. In each gure, there are curves referring to the search m o d e l `S', the model with employment lotteries `L', and the two v ersions of the matching model where the workers' relative share of the match surplus is either constant `Ma' or positively related to the layo cost `Mb'.
Figures 1 through 5 display a n umber of similarities across the di erent frameworks. A higher layo cost is associated with a lower reservation productivity in gure 1. That is, rms choose to retain workers with lower productivity when it becomes more costly to lay them o and, hence, the average output per employed worker decreases in gure 2.
Another consequence of a lower reservation productivity is fewer layo s as a fraction of employment as shown in gure 3 but, according to gure 4, total layo costs as a fraction of GNP is still increasing in the layo cost. Figure 5 reveals changing fortunes for the unemployed. A higher layo cost reduces the probability of nding a job. This maps directly into a lower probability o f w orking in the model with employment lotteries, while the same aspect manifests itself in the search model and the matching model as a lower probability of nding a job within, let say, 1 0 w eeks of unemployment. Note especially the sharply declining probability in the matching model where the worker's relative share of the match surplus is positively related to the layo tax.
In contrast to these qualitative similarities across frameworks, a stark di erence appears in gure 6. Employment increases with higher layo costs in the search model and the matching model with a constant relative split of the match surplus, while the opposite is true in the two other models. We next demonstrate that these employment e ects are robust to large perturbations in parameter values, before turning to a discussion of the economic forces at work. 
Sensitivity Analysis
To examine the sensitivity of the results to changes in the parameterization of the models, we h a ve analyzed deviations of plus and minus 50 percent in all parameter values or, in some cases, deviations of plus and minus 50 percent in the relevant economic measures implied by the parameters. An example of the latter is the discount factor which i s c hosen to be 0:9985 in the baseline case, making the annual interest rate 4:0 percent. We analyze deviations in such that the annual interest rate is either 2:0 o r 6 :0 percent. In each sensitivity t e s t o f a n y one parameter, all other parameters are kept at their values in the benchmark calibration of section 4.1.
Besides the discount factor, other parameters common to all models are varied as follows. The probability of drawing a new productivity l e v el at work in the benchmark parameterization is such t h a t a w orker will on average draw a new productivity once a year. We examine deviations in this probability so that the average time between productivity draws is 0:5 o r 1 :5 y ears. The variance of the conditional distribution of new productivity levels is also decreased and increased by 50 percent relative to its benchmark value of 0:01.
Concerning the search model, we study deviations of plus and minus 50 percent i n each parameter of the functions mapping search i n tensities into disutility of search and probabilities of obtaining a wage o er; f 0 ; 0 ; 1 g. The remaining parameter in the search model is the disutility o f w ork A s which is equal to 0:5 in the benchmark case. We d o examine a 50 percent reduction in this parameter but we only allow for an upper parameter value of 0:6 since a full 50 percent increase makes the disutility o f w ork equal to the productivity of a new job which turns out to close down all economic activity. Except for this caveat which also applies to the matching framework, we analyze deviations of plus and minus 50 percent in all other parameters speci c to the matching model, i.e., the cost of posting a vacancy and the parameters in the matching function and the Nash product; f; ; ; g.
Because of the recursive nature of the employment lottery model where the reservation productivity is computed before calculating the employment to population ratio, it turns out that the parameter value of the disutility o f w orking does not a ect the relative change in employment in response to a change in the layo tax. But we do perform a sensitivity analysis with respect to the coe cient of relative risk aversion in consumption which i s unity in the benchmark case of logarithmic utility. W e examine a 50 percent increase and decrease in that coe cient for the utility function uc = c 1, , 1=1 , .
The results of the sensitivity analysis are reported in gures 7 through 10. The layo tax takes on three values, 2 f 0; 10; 20g. Recall that = 10 and = 20 correspond roughly to half a year and one year of an average worker's output, respectively, i n t h e benchmark calibration. Of course, this approximation may no longer hold for some of our sensitivity tests which all involve large perturbations in parameters. Each employment index is normalized to unity at a zero layo tax for the particular parameterization considered. The solid line in a gure reproduces the benchmark result from gure 6 but here only for three values of the layo tax.
Figures 7 through 10 show robustness of our earlier ndings that a layo tax is associated with higher employment in the search model and the matching model with a constant relative split of the match surplus, and lower employment in the other two m o d e l s . T o get a feel for the sensitivity analysis let us comment on a couple of outliers in the gures. The upper curve in gure 7 is obtained when picking a higher probability of drawing a new productivity level at work so that the average time between draws is cut by 50 percent to just half a year. At a zero layo tax, this choice of parameter value yields the highest unemployment rate in the search model among all its parameterizations. This is because the frequent arrivals of new productivity levels spur a large amount of reallocation. This frictional unemployment is then found to fall relatively sharply when increasing the layo tax, producing large increases in the employment index. The same argument is true for the matching model with a constant relative split of the match surplus where this parameter perturbation corresponds to one of the two highest curves in gure 8. Concerning the upper and the lower curve for the employment lottery model in gure 10, these are obtained when setting the coe cient of relative risk aversion equal to 1.5 and 0.5, relatively. A l o w risk aversion implies here also a higher willingness to substitute leisure for consumption which explains why employment plummets in response to a layo tax that reduces the attractiveness of working. 
Economic Forces at Work
Search m odel
The intuition for lower unemployment in the search model is quite straightforward. Layo costs make it more costly to reallocate labor in response to productivity s h o c ks. Fewer reallocations in the economy translates into less frictional unemployment and workers are locked into" their jobs. Lower unemployment i s t h us attained at the cost of a less e cient labor allocation. The common argument that layo costs will reduce the number of jobs in the economy does not apply for the following reason. Jobs are available in the search model as long as the unemployed have reasonable" demands for compensation. Layo costs will naturally reduce labor's earnings because of not only the layo costs incurred in the production process but also the lower productivity associated with a less e cient labor allocation. However, workers who do accept necessary cuts in compensation will be working in the search model and they will on average enjoy longer job tenures as compared to an economy without layo costs.
There is one quali cation to the above description of the economic forces at work in the search model. The presence of layo costs makes jobs less attractive, thus, the potential return to job search falls. This lower return causes unemployed workers to invest less in job search, i.e., they choose a lower search i n tensity. The reduced search i n tensity is re ected in gure 5 in form of a lower probability of nding a job within 10 weeks. 5 If we x the length of job tenures in the model, a lower search i n tensity w ould necessarily increase the economy's unemployment rate. As an illustration, consider the following alternative parameterization with two possible values of the productivity l e v el on the job, where the transition probabilities, p; p 0 , are chosen so that the equilibrium level of unemployment without layo costs is roughly the same as in Section 4. The parameterization has the implication that all jobs in an equilibrium are exogenously destroyed at the rate :005, i.e., layo costs cannot a ect the length of job tenures. As a consequence, gure 11 shows how higher layo costs which reduce workers' search i n tensity m ust necessarily increase unemployment. In the more general case, the nal e ect upon equilibrium unemployment depends on the relative importance of less diligent job search v ersus longer job tenures. 
Matching model
Unemployment i s a l s o l o wer with layo costs in the matching model with a constant relative split of the match surplus, as shown in gure 6. The explanation is once again that the costly reallocation of labor results in longer job tenures and lower frictional unemployment. But as before there exists an opposing e ect that would necessarily increase the unemployment rate if the length of job tenures was exogenously given in our model. This time the opposing e ect is not workers' search i n tensity falling in response to less attractive jobs but rather the impact of layo costs on rms' ability t o r e c o ver incurred vacancy costs. It is instructive to examine the break-even condition for new vacancies in 10.a. The left-hand side of 10.a is the expected gain of posting a vacancy which is negatively a ected by a higher layo cost. In an equilibrium, the expected gain must be restored and be equal to the cost of posting a vacancy, . Market forces can attain this outcome in two w ays; 1 a longer average job tenure through a lower reservation productivity on the job means that the expected discounted stream of surpluses from a consummated match, Zp o , becomes larger; 2 a higher unemployment t o v acancy ratio maps into a higher probability of lling a vacancy, Mu; v=v, which also increases the expected gain of posting a vacancy. While longer job tenures tend to decrease unemployment, a higher probability of lling a vacancy a higher unemployment t o v acancy ratio may be associated with a higher absolute level of unemployment. In the special case when the length of job tenures is exogenously given, higher layo costs will unambiguously raise both the unemployment t o v acancy ratio and the level of unemployment, as shown by Burda 1992. Our matching model with the parameterization in 16 inherits those same properties, and the employment e ects are depicted in gure 11.
The alternative speci cation of the matching model where workers' relative share of the match surplus increases with the layo cost has dramatically di erent employment implications. Employment in gure 6 is seen to plummet in response to higher layo costs. The equilibrium condition that rms nance incurred vacancy costs with retained earnings from the matches becomes exceedingly di cult to satisfy when a higher layo cost erodes the fraction of match surpluses going to rms. Firms can only break even if the expected time to ll a vacancy is cut dramatically, i.e., there has to be a large number of unemployed workers for each posted vacancy. This equilibrium outcome is re ected in the very low probability o f a w orker nding a job within 10 weeks in gure 5. 6 But there is also a quali cation to the economic forces at work in the matching model where workers' relative share of the match surplus increases with the layo cost. The model has the same opposing e ects on the equilibrium unemployment rate as in the matching model with a constant relative split of the match surplus. We can therefore nd a parameterization for which higher layo costs can actually reduce the unemployment rate due to an endogenous large increase in the length of job tenures that outweighs the decline in the rms' share of the match surplus. Such an example is as follows, 
Model with employment lotteries
As in Hopenhayn and Rogerson 1993 , the model with employment lotteries delivers the result that employment decreases with a higher layo cost. In general, a higher layo cost is synonymous from a private perspective to a deterioration in the production technology, the optimal change in the workers' employment lotteries will therefore depend on the strength of the substitution e ect versus the income e ect. Loosely speaking, the rst-order impact of the income e ect is eliminated by t h e g o vernment lump-sum transfer of the layo tax revenues back to the private economy. T h us, layo costs in models with employment lotteries have strong negative e m p l o yment implications caused by substitution away from consumption toward leisure.
In the special case of logarithmic preferences used by Hopenhayn and Rogerson, the optimal choice of employment in 15 is given by
The precise employment e ect is here driven by pro t ows from rms gross of layo taxes expressed in terms of the wage rate. Since these pro ts are to a large extent generated in order to pay for rms' future layo taxes, a higher layo tax tends to increase the accumulation of such funds with a corresponding negative e ect on the optimal choice of employment. However, it is conceivable that the peculiar parameterization in 17 might overturn the monotonicity of pro t ows when the reservation productivity suddenly falls from 0:75 to 0:70 with a dramatic reduction in the layo incidence by a factor of 10. This conjecture is con rmed in gure 12 where employment increases when moving from a layo tax of 7 to 8. To summarize, it takes fairly extreme parameterizations to overturn the negative employment implications of layo taxes in models with employment lotteries. The rst-order e ect in these models is that agents substitute away from consumption toward leisure by reducing the probability o f w orking in the lotteries.
Welfare Implications
The equilibria without layo taxes are Pareto optimal in the models of this paper. This can be seen by considering the issues of externalities and missing markets. First, there are no externalities in the search model or the model with employment lotteries, and we have assumed that the parameter restriction for e ciency holds in the matching model see footnote 4. Second, markets are complete in the model with employment lotteries, and the assumption of risk-neutral workers in the search model and the matching model makes the absence of insurance markets in those models unimportant. Thus, the fact that the laissez-faire outcomes are Pareto optimal implies that the imposition of layo taxes cannot lead to any P areto improvements but instead, these taxes reduce welfare by distorting rms' and workers' behavior. Note that the welfare losses are solely due to adverse incentive e ects since there are no real resources consumed in the collection of layo taxes or in the lump-sum transfer of tax revenues back to the private economy.
The negative relationship between layo taxes and the reservation productivity in Figure 1 is symptomatic of the welfare losses associated with layo taxes. Since the laissez-faire outcomes are rst best, it is suboptimal to have w orkers employed in jobs with productivities below the reservation productivity at a zero layo tax. To q u a n tify the welfare losses of the ine cient labor allocation and other adverse e ects of layo taxes, we compute the amount of consumption per period that would have to be con scated from a worker in the laissez-faire economy to make him as worse o as if he were living in an equilibrium with layo taxes. These consumption equivalences are expressed as a fraction of per-capita laissez-faire consumption. Because of the absence of insurance markets in the search m o d e l and the matching model, there will be one measure for each possible state of a worker, i.e., unemployed versus employed, and the productivity o f a n y current job. Instead of computing a weighted welfare measure across agents in di erent states, we nd it instructive to examine the welfare of an employed and an unemployed worker separately. Concerning the former state, we c hoose a worker who has just nd a job. Recall our assumption that all new jobs have productivity p o .
Using the benchmark parameterization in Section 4, gures 13 and 14 depict the welfare losses of layo taxes experienced by a job nder and an unemployed worker, respectively.
As a comparison, when Hopenhayn and Rogerson 1993 calibrated their employmentlottery model allowing for elaborate rm-size dynamics, they found welfare losses in the order of 1.3 2.8 at a layo tax equal to 6 months 12 months of wages. Since that kind of layo tax correspond to = 1 0 = 20 in our calibration, we see that similar welfare losses arise in two of our bare-bones models and the other two, including the model with employment lotteries, are associated with even larger losses. We conclude, in agreement with Hopenhayn and Rogerson, that the welfare losses arising from layo taxes can be quite substantial, and we add that this nding seems to hold across di erent frameworks of employment determination. A comparison of gures 13 and 14 shows that the welfare losses of a job nder and an unemployed worker are rather similar except for one of our models. Similar welfare losses in the model with employment lotteries is hardly surprising since the only di erence between an employed worker and an unemployed worker is the current period's work e ort. Next period, they will be ex ante identical and participate in the same employment lottery. In the search model and the matching models, there is no aggregate consumption sharing and an unemployed worker's welfare depends crucially on the probability of nding a job. From gure 5, we k n o w that this probability falls sharply in response to a higher layo tax in the matching model where workers' relative share of the match surplus is positively related to the layo tax. This explains why the welfare loss of an unemployed worker as compared to a job nder is so much larger in that model.
As described, our model speci cations do not allow for any positive w elfare e ects of layo taxes. In order to have such e ects, the laissez-faire outcomes would have t o be distorted by externalities or missing markets. An example of the latter is provided by Alvarez and Veracierto 1998, who consider a search model with missing insurance markets and risk-averse workers. They show that layo taxes can improve w elfare by providing implicit insurance to workers through longer job tenures and lower unemployment. The fact that unemployment falls in their analysis should not come as a surprise. The point o f our analysis is that there is a strong presumption why e m p l o yment implications of layo taxes should be positive in a search model, and the economic force at work is obviously robust to the speci cation of the rest of the model.
Concluding Comments
What does general equilibrium analysis tell us about the e ects of layo costs? This paper sheds light on the implications of three dominant frameworks of employment determination; search models, matching models and models with employment lotteries. The predictions of these various frameworks are shown to be the same in a number of economic dimensions. For example, layo costs do reduce the reservation productivity i n layo decisions and thereby diminish the incidence of layo s. The economic cost of doing so manifests in a less e cient allocation of labor. Despite these common implications, the models provide diametrically di erent answers to how l a yo costs a ect employment. Our bare-bones versions of the models help us to understand their contradictory conclusions.
In each framework, we identify the main economic force at work and how i t i n teracts with features of the model to produce employment outcomes. In search models and matching models with the standard assumption of a constant relative split of the match s u r p l u s between rms and workers, layo costs tend to increase employment b y reducing labor reallocation, whereas employment e ects tend to be negative in models with employment lotteries due to the diminished private return to work. Note that the disparate employment outcomes are driven by forces that are present in all three frameworks. Layo costs also reduce labor turnover in models with employment lotteries but since these models have no frictional unemployment, the central causation of the other two models is absent. Layo costs also make w orking less attractive in search models and matching models but here there are no negative employment e ects associated with indivisibilities in individual labor supply. The reason is that workers in these models are typically assumed to have linear preferences or, in the case of risk aversion, the common assumption of market incompleteness precludes employment lotteries and aggregate consumption sharing. In matching models where the workers' relative share of the match surplus increases with layo costs, there is still another economic force at work that completely dominates everything else. Strong negative employment e ects of layo costs arise through an increase in the e ective bargaining strength of workers.
We here demonstrate that the Mortensen and Pissarides' 1999 analysis of a two-tier wage system have the same implications as a model with Nash product 7.a. The only di erence between the two formulations is that the wage in the Mortensen and Pissarides' setting is reduced in the rst period by the worker's share of any f u t u r e l a yo tax, and future wages are increased by an amount equal to the net interest on this posted bond."
The wage function associated with Nash product 7.a is obtained from 11 and 8. where the second equalities follow from 18 and 19, and r ,1 , 1.
Given the conjecture that the match surplus Zp is identical for the two models, we have shown that the present v alue of a worker's total compensation for any completed job is the same across models which in turn implies the same present v alue of a rm's payo s. It then follows that the two models share the same equilibrium allocation of labor in spite of the di erent bargaining formulations.
